{
  "name": "Sandworm Team: ICS ATT&CK",
  "versions": {
    "attack": "17",
    "navigator": "5.1.0",
    "layer": "4.5"
  },
  "domain": "ics-attack",
  "description": "Review-dated ics ATT&CK layer for Sandworm Team. Technique comments retain their source and activity scope; overlapping designations are not asserted to be exact aliases. Last reviewed 2026-07-19.",
  "filters": {
    "platforms": []
  },
  "sorting": 0,
  "layout": {
    "layout": "side",
    "aggregateFunction": "average",
    "showID": true,
    "showName": true,
    "showAggregateScores": false,
    "countUnscored": false
  },
  "hideDisabled": false,
  "techniques": [
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0822",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Valid accounts and remote services provided access to operator and control environments. Scope: Sandworm. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Sandworm"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0823",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Attackers operated SCADA/HMI interfaces to issue breaker commands during the 2015 attack. Scope: 2015 Ukraine campaign. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "2015 Ukraine campaign"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0805",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Firmware on serial-to-Ethernet converters was overwritten to sever downstream communications. Scope: 2015 Ukraine campaign. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "2015 Ukraine campaign"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0853",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "A native MicroSCADA utility ran attacker-supplied SCIL commands from an ISO mounted on the hosting hypervisor, achieving process impact without custom ICS malware. Scope: October 2022 Ukraine campaign. Sources: Mandiant / Google Cloud.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "October 2022 Ukraine campaign"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0812",
      "color": "#dcbb50",
      "comment": "Weak boundaries between enterprise and control identity, including shared domain accounts and flat segmentation, eased the pivot into process networks. Scope: Ukraine electric-power campaigns. Sources: Joe Slowik, Dragos (VB2018), CISA and partner agencies.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Ukraine electric-power campaigns"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "medium"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0809",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Wipers were deployed after or alongside process impact to obstruct recovery and destroy forensic evidence, including CaddyWiper two days after the October 2022 outage. Scope: Sandworm. Sources: Mandiant / Google Cloud, ESET Research.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Sandworm"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0855",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Protocol-valid commands were issued to electric substation equipment. Scope: Ukraine electric-power campaigns. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK, ESET Research.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Ukraine electric-power campaigns"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0813",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Device and communication sabotage denied operators reliable downstream control. Scope: 2015 Ukraine campaign. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "2015 Ukraine campaign"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0826",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Breaker operations and destructive actions interrupted electric service and system availability. Scope: Ukraine electric-power campaigns. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Ukraine electric-power campaigns"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0827",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Operators lost remote control and relied on manual restoration procedures. Scope: 2015 Ukraine campaign. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "2015 Ukraine campaign"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "techniqueID": "T0831",
      "color": "#09bac9",
      "comment": "Breaker states and operational commands were deliberately altered to disrupt the grid. Scope: Ukraine electric-power campaigns. Sources: MITRE ATT&CK, ESET Research.",
      "enabled": true,
      "metadata": [
        {
          "name": "Scope",
          "value": "Ukraine electric-power campaigns"
        },
        {
          "name": "Confidence",
          "value": "high"
        },
        {
          "name": "Last reviewed",
          "value": "2026-07-19"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "gradient": {
    "colors": [
      "#fafaf8",
      "#09bac9"
    ],
    "minValue": 0,
    "maxValue": 100
  },
  "legendItems": [
    {
      "label": "High-confidence public mapping",
      "color": "#09bac9"
    },
    {
      "label": "Medium-confidence public mapping",
      "color": "#dcbb50"
    }
  ],
  "metadata": [
    {
      "name": "Primary cluster",
      "value": "Sandworm Team"
    },
    {
      "name": "Designation model",
      "value": "Source-scoped relationships; see technique comments"
    },
    {
      "name": "Distribution",
      "value": "TLP:CLEAR"
    }
  ],
  "links": [
    {
      "label": "MITRE ATT&CK",
      "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/"
    },
    {
      "label": "U.S. Department of Justice",
      "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware"
    },
    {
      "label": "CISA and partner agencies",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-110a"
    },
    {
      "label": "ESET Research",
      "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/"
    },
    {
      "label": "Google Threat Intelligence Group",
      "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt44-unearthing-sandworm"
    },
    {
      "label": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence",
      "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/12/the-badpilot-campaign-seashell-blizzard-subgroup-conducts-multiyear-global-access-operation/"
    },
    {
      "label": "ESET Research",
      "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
    },
    {
      "label": "ESET Research",
      "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/"
    },
    {
      "label": "Joe Slowik, Dragos (VB2018)",
      "url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2018/VB2018-Slowik.pdf"
    },
    {
      "label": "CERT-UA",
      "url": "https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518"
    },
    {
      "label": "Mandiant / Google Cloud",
      "url": "https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/sandworm-disrupts-power-ukraine-operational-technology"
    }
  ],
  "showTacticRowBackground": false,
  "tacticRowBackground": "#dddddd",
  "selectTechniquesAcrossTactics": true,
  "selectSubtechniquesWithParent": false
}